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A common wisdom among analysts and observers of the six monarchies of the 
Persian Gulf is that they are an island of stability in a chaotic Middle East. Their 
capacity to resist the ‘Arab Spring’ turmoil is often given as an argument for the 
idea that, among Arab countries, monarchies resist better than republics and that 
hydrocarbon rich states are more robust than non-rentier or poor rentier states. 
Published in the year following the ‘Arab Spring’, the book authored by Christopher 
Davidson takes the opposing view. The central thesis is indeed that the stability of 
the Gulf monarchies is only an illusion that will soon be dispelled and that these 
countries, because of weaknesses that are “deep-rooted, structural, and seemingly 
unsolvable” (p. 111), will collapse in a near future.
In order to support his argument, the author first analyses the ‘survival strategies’ 
of the Gulf regimes, distinguishing between domestic and external factors. While 
he takes into account the rentier political economy of the region which, in the 
existing literature, is most often put forward as a major explanatory factor behind 
the peculiarities of the Gulf monarchies’ ruling bargain, he does not stop at socio-
economic factors but analyses other types of legitimation strategies, like the 
personality cult developed by rulers or the enormous amount of resources devoted to 
cultural projects which aim at reinforcing a sense of nationhood as well as loyalty to 
the incumbents. Among the external factors accounting for the steadfastness of the 
Gulf regimes, he points at the huge financial means which rulers have used to build 
a global soft power based on diplomatic brokerage, strategic investments notably 
in the West and the development of cultural and academic institutions at home and 
abroad. Here interesting developments are to be found on the logics behind the 
financing of academic institutions in the West dedicated to the study of the Gulf or 
the Middle East (pp. 98–104), a way to control the public knowledge that is being 
produced on the region.
Among the weaknesses that are undermining the ruling bargain, Davidson first 
lists the increasing inability of the regimes to maintain the same, very generous, level 
of allowances and subsidies to their citizens, which challenges their “eudemonic 
legitimacy” (p. 49). This is due to the progressive depleting of oil reserves but also 
to the increase of the population, who consume a growing proportion of the rentier 
resources. Countries like Bahrain and Oman are already affected, with much reduced 
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oil reserves which, moreover, are more costly to extract than in neighbouring 
Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. Davidson points at the huge labour problem faced by the 
Gulf monarchies, where years of lavish distribution have made the phenomenon 
of voluntary unemployment widespread, especially among young men, who prefer 
to wait for a good sinecure in the public sector rather than compete in the labour 
market. However, increasingly important also is involuntary unemployment, which 
in particular affects the poorer Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman). Fiscal 
imbalances, overall, render more and more problematic the provision of what Gulf 
citizens consider as basic services. A telling example is the provision of public 
housing, a pillar of the Gulf welfare state whereby every citizen, by the sole virtue 
of his nationality, is entitled to free or highly subsidised housing. Today, the waiting 
lists to access such housing are very long, meaning that, in the poorer countries, 
people often have to wait for 10 years or more.
Among the domestic weaknesses listed by the author is also the growing 
discrimination against significant portions of the national populations. Two cases are 
given more particular attention - the stateless peoples and the Shias. The presence of 
stateless peoples, which is a matter of public debate only in Kuwait, results from the 
unwillingness of states to augment the number of nationals in increasingly difficult 
fiscal situations or the lack of trust in peoples who claim to be nationals but are 
deemed to be of controversial national, tribal or ethnic backgrounds (many are of 
Bedouin descent, many others are suspected of coming from hostile foreign countries 
like Iraq, Iran or even Saudi Arabia, which is often seen as a cumbersome big brother 
by small emirates). Discrimination against Shia nationals is even more problematic 
since it undermines the national integration process. The problem is particularly 
widespread in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, where opposition movements are well 
structured among Shia communities, among whom there are regular disturbances 
and riots. 
Among the external factors listed by the author to support his thesis of the 
coming collapse is the economy-driven transformation of public social practices 
under the influence of the massive influx of mostly non-Muslim foreigners, labour 
expatriates but also tourists. The growth of public alcohol consumption, the tolerance 
of prostitution and the general relaxation of dress-codes and social behaviour is 
experienced by many citizens as an encroachment on Arab and Islamic values of 
which Gulf rulers pretend to be the upholders. This feeling is also created by the 
deepening of security relations with the West, which, among other things, has resulted 
in an increased Western (American, British, French) military presence in the smaller 
emirates. As a result, the Arab and Islamic legitimacy of the incumbents is weakened, 
most notably when they face the critique of organised oppositions claiming to defend 
Islamic authenticity. The foreign policy is also a factor of strain since some Gulf 
countries are moving away from the neutral position in regional politics built by their 
predecessors and tend to espouse more aggressive stances towards some powerful 
neighbours. Iran is a case in point, which several Gulf monarchies (Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain and the UAE) have been antagonising. This is putting them on the “front 
line of any fresh conflict in the Persian Gulf” (p. 171), in particular when these same 
states endeavour to court Israel, with whom they are actually eager to normalise 
relations. Finally, Davidson points to the increasing internal factionalism within the 
ruling dynasties, where coups d’Etat might well become a customary practice.
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All in all, After the Sheikhs, which has been applauded by critics, makes a useful 
contribution to the debate about the Gulf monarchies. However, it is first and foremost 
made for a general audience that has little or no knowledge of these countries. A 
more informed audience might find the book lacking in many ways. First, although 
he has accumulated an impressive wealth of information, the author relies a lot on 
newspapers (in English) without systematically cross-checking information with 
other sources. This is particularly striking when he discusses such an important issue 
as labour market dynamics, for which he relies uncritically on figures released in 
the press or by international institutions rather than going directly to the statistics 
released by the local institutions, which are now very often available on the Internet 
and sometimes contradict those he gives. He also ignores the academic literature 
which discusses these figures.
Another flaw is the author’s over-reliance on his deep knowledge of the United 
Arab Emirates, where he has lived and worked and on which he has authored two 
reference books. A significant number of the examples are taken from this country 
and phenomena that are proper to it are uncritically applied to the others. Hence the 
description of wealth distribution through charities sponsored by members of the 
ruling families, while it perfectly applies to countries like the UAE, Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia, only marginally applies to other countries where distribution is much more 
institutionalised and less personalised. Overall, the degree of institutionalisation 
differs sharply from one country to another, and so is the way the social contract 
is being crafted. The over-reliance on the Emirati model is moreover distorting the 
analysis of state-society relations. Hence, the assertion that opposition movements 
in the Gulf monarchies “have not been broad-based and represented only narrow 
sections of the indigenous populations” cannot be applied to Bahrain, Kuwait and 
even Saudi Arabia, where there are deep-seated and sometimes well-structured 
opposition movements. 
Overall, while the provocative thesis that the Gulf monarchies will soon collapse 
has enriched the debates, it can seem a bit unsophisticated to political scientists, 
especially when the author takes the precaution of underlining that they will collapse 
or “at least most of them in their present form” (p. 2). This puts the debate in the fairly 
different analytical framework of change rather than that of the rapid, revolutionary 
breakdown that the title is suggesting. Indeed, the structural weaknesses he analyses 
only show that the ruling bargain such as it was progressively crafted following the 
development of the oil economy is no more sustainable, not that it cannot be adapted. 
Actually, the Gulf monarchies are engaged in reforms which aim at adjusting the 
ruling bargain, in particular the economic aspects of it. While not as fast and far 
reaching as one could expect, these reforms are actually modifying state-society 
relations. In the poorer countries where the small fiscal room of manoeuvre renders 
them more urgent, different forms of taxation are now being implemented, including 
on citizens (for example to finance workforce nationalisation in Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain and Oman). Subsidies are being reduced on basic goods and services. In 
Bahrain and Oman, a great number of nationals are now working in the purely private 
sector, including in such socially demeaning jobs, by local standards, as supermarket 
cashiers or salesmen – and saleswomen – in shopping malls. In other words, the 
traditional political economy is shifting. While this creates tensions, these have been 
managed so far.
European Review of International Studies, Volume 3/2016122
Moreover, three years now after the ‘Arab Spring’, the events have shown 
that repression is a very efficient means to deal with discontent, and that regimes 
can be reshuffled while none of what analysts see as unmanageable economic and 
political contradictions are being addressed. Actually, the history is full of examples 
of lasting regimes which display fiscal imbalances, antagonise their neighbours and 
discriminate against their population. 
